



# PHILADELPHIA

## *FEDERATION of TEACHERS*

Committee of the Whole  
Philadelphia City Council

February 17, 2026 | Philadelphia, PA

Testimony of LeShawna Coleman, Chief of Staff  
Jerry Roseman, Director of Environmental Science  
Philadelphia Federation of Teachers

### **Testimony of LeShawna Coleman**

Good morning, Council President Johnson, Education Chair Thomas, and members of the Committee of the Whole. My name is LeShawna Coleman, Chief of Staff of the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, or PFT Local 3. President Arthur Steinberg could not be here today due to an AFT Executive Committee meeting.

The PFT represents more than 14,000 educators who work in the School District of Philadelphia. We are the exclusive bargaining agent for Philly public school educators, and are proud to be the foremost advocates for children's education, health, and wellness in the City of Philadelphia.

We often remind the District that educators know the conditions of our school facilities inside and out. As the recent snowstorm and deep freeze have demonstrated, when our members' experience and knowledge are ignored - students and families pay the price.

No one who works for the School District knows the urgency of modernizing aging pipes, sewer systems, shoddy insulation, and heating and cooling systems more acutely than PFT members. Just ask those of us who moved heaven and earth these

last several weeks to distribute extra coats and scarves to students in 40-degree classrooms. A week ago today, Stetson Middle School went virtual due to still-freezing building conditions.

Our members know that an ambitious plan for our facilities is overdue. But we also know that mass closures a decade ago did not result in meaningful cost savings to the District. Communities where vacant, abandoned former schools sit – attracting illegal dumping and crime – know that they are not better off.

Our position remains: Our schools need fixing and funding - NOT closure. Following a thorough review, the PFT has concluded that the District's 10-year Facilities Master Plan, or FMP, does not provide sufficient detail or data to inform binding decisions about school closures, co-location, or re-purposing.

We did not reach this conclusion in haste. We spent the past month poring over the \$2.8 billion plan, checking assertions and claims against the experiences of our members who know these buildings best.

The PFT is gravely concerned that the FMP will provoke distrust and anxiety among beloved, established educators in schools designated for closure. It is imperative that execution of the plan does not spark an exodus of teachers and specialists to surrounding districts and exacerbate a crisis-level staffing shortage in Philly public schools.

I am here today alongside Jerry Roseman, the PFT's Director of Environmental Science and a leading expert on the District's aging – and historically toxic – facilities. You will hear him detail more specific concerns about data, methodology, and transparency.

Our members know that every dollar put into the District, whether from the federal or state or local governments, is hard-fought and deserved - because the PFT has been

fighting for our schools' fair share of funding since our founding.

We know hard decisions must be made to address student overcrowding in one school and empty floors and classrooms in another school just a few neighborhoods over. We know our students and staff facing poor and uncomfortable building conditions deserve immediate relief.

But the FMP as proposed raises far more questions than have been answered since its release in January. The District must do better, show their work, and provide all data used to make determinations about targeted schools.

Austerity and institutional discriminatory practices against Black and brown communities are why we are here today, but let's be clear: it is OUR union of educators, OUR students and families, and OUR neighbors who hold the solutions for a better future for our schools. Our union has a saying that resonates especially in long under-resourced communities, "Nothing about us, without us."

For your convenience, we have transmitted our written testimony along with supplemental charts and data to the offices of every member. I am happy to answer any questions you have after Mr. Roseman shares our findings.

### **Testimony of Jerry Roseman**

Good morning, and thank you for the opportunity to testify. My name is Jerry Roseman, and I serve as Director of Environmental Science for the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers.

I want to start with shared ground: Philadelphia must fix its public school facilities – urgently – and we cannot afford another planning effort that produces presentations without an implementation-ready, verifiable plan. We support urgent investment. But we also insist on a basic standard: no student or staff member should be moved into a receiving school with worse conditions—or into a building that cannot safely support the added enrollment and services.

For months, multiple stakeholder groups – including members of the District’s own advisory committees – have repeatedly asked for the underlying datasets and scoring rubrics behind the District’s four (4) major scores: building condition, program alignment, capacity/utilization, and vulnerability. Still, those details have not been released in a way that allows independent replication or verification, even to the members of the Project Planning Committee set up by the District and that I was an invited participant/member on; and the continued lack of disclosure is now an implementation risk in itself – because it prevents the public and elected officials from validating decisions that will disrupt dozens of school communities.

Without the data, the definitions, and the rubrics, without the District “showing its’ work,” Philadelphia City Council, and all of us, are being asked to absorb high-stakes recommendations – closures, moves, co-locations, and capital sequencing – without being able to check the math.

I also want to flag a specific technical concern that has major real-world consequences: the school building-level score can hide serious failures in critical systems. Even when a building is labeled “Fair” – or sometimes even “Good” – it still has Poor/Unsatisfactory HVAC and ventilation, roofs, windows, electrical, or plumbing. Those system failures are exactly what drive temperature extremes, leaks, indoor air quality problems, and repeated disruptions to teaching and learning. So, the question is not only “how many buildings are Poor or Unsatisfactory,” but how many unsatisfactory systems exist and how many students and staff are in schools where critical systems are failing, regardless of the overall label.

Finally, our on-the-ground, as-lived experience data – from the PFT Problem Reporter (Healthy Schools Tracker) and district-wide targeted condition surveys we conducted with PFT Staff and school building representatives in 2025 – aligns with these concerns. Educators and staff report recurring issues – heat and ventilation problems, leaks and water damage, pests, and safety hazards – often in the same buildings that are being evaluated and moved around in this plan. That’s not anecdote; it’s a pattern. The District should treat stakeholder-reported conditions as a verification layer – so decisions about receiving sites and sequencing are grounded in what people are actually experiencing.

My testimony today is therefore a practical request – not to stop planning, but to convert the current draft into a verifiable, implementation-ready plan. That means: publish the underlying data and scoring methods; provide a clear capacity methodology; define what “modernize” and “maintain” mean at the building-and-system level; and show a school-level implementation path that proves “no harm,” especially for receiving schools.

Because I am aware that my time here today is limited, I will focus on several top-line conclusions. I have submitted a comprehensive written document for the record that contains the granular data and supporting analysis behind these points, with more detailed reporting to follow.

Here are the five (5) main areas I’m asking Council to focus on today: transparency, capacity, modernization vs. maintenance scope, maintenance and operations, and whether the plan as presented can actually be accomplished as is or if, as we believe, a modified way forward is needed.

First: **the transparency and data gap.** Right now, the plan is built on summary scores and categories – but the underlying “show-your-work” information is missing. That means stakeholders can’t verify basic claims: how the scores were calculated, what inputs were used, how they were weighted, how cut-points were set, and how multi-building campuses were handled.

And that gap matters because independent review of the data we do have – prior FCA/FCI information, system-level condition data, and our own stakeholder reporting – suggests serious conditions and critical system failures that may not be fully captured by building-level labels. In plain terms: a “Fair” building score can still hide a “Poor” HVAC system, a failing roof, or electrical and plumbing deficiencies (supporting information is provided following our testimony in our written report).

Serious data inputs that must help inform school building condition status and needed remediation, response, repair, and even modernization are not included at all – there is no mention of how asbestos and lead containing building materials were assessed, included or accounted for in the proposed plan decision-making.

Finally, even for the schools most directly impacted, the District has not provided a school-by-school implementation path – what will be fixed, when, for how much, and what interim protections are in place. Without that, communities are being asked to accept disruption without being able to see the mitigation plan and it is impossible to know if the plan represents something that can be plausibly implemented.

**Council ask:** require the District to publish the raw inputs and scoring rubrics, and provide a school-by-school scope/schedule summary before irreversible actions proceed – we can share our most recent data request, made to the District, with Council if requested.

Second: **related to capacity and utilization.** The District’s published capacity numbers are central to receiving-school decisions. But our review – using the District’s own educational design guidelines and space standards – raises serious questions about whether some capacity figures are realistic, accurate or actually comply with what the SDP has published once accounting for real educational space needs, specialized program space, and common-space constraints.

Capacity is not a single number you can pull from gross square footage. It depends on classroom counts and classroom types, special education and support rooms, Pre-K and related services, arts and CTE needs, and the real limits of cafeteria, gym, and student support spaces. If capacity is overstated, the risk is predictable: crowding, loss of supports, reduced service delivery, and degraded learning conditions – exactly in the schools asked to absorb additional students. It also contributes to worsening school building and environmental conditions increasing potential student risk.

**Council ask:** require the District to publish the capacity methodology and a “receiving-school readiness” demonstration for each receiving site that includes room inventory, class size assumptions, supports, and any upgrades required before moves occur.

Third: **what does “modernize” versus “maintain” actually mean?** Those terms are used repeatedly, but they are not defined in a way that allows school communities – or Council – to understand the difference in scope, timeline, or expected outcome.

If “modernize” is meant to move buildings from Poor/Unsatisfactory to Good, then the plan must specify which systems will be brought up to what performance standard – especially HVAC/ventilation and thermal comfort – and when. And if “maintain” is meant to keep buildings safe and functional, then the plan must specify what maintenance standard, staffing, and response times will be achieved, not simply that maintenance will happen.

Referring to the set of tables and charts we’ve provided along with our written testimony provides both context and scope details informing the scale of the problems and scale of the needs,

Also missing is a critical element: describing a clear plan for how work will be done safely in occupied buildings, especially receiving schools and buildings used as swing space. If we don’t name that explicitly, we risk increasing hazards during the repair process itself.

**Council ask:** require written definitions and school-level scopes for “modernize” and “maintain,” including occupied-building safety protocols and phasing plans.

Fourth: **maintenance and operations.** For educators and students, M&O is the “right now” work – heat, ventilation, leaks, bathrooms, electrical outages, pests, and basic cleanliness. In an older portfolio with deferred maintenance, M&O capacity is not optional; it is the difference between stable buildings and cascading failures.

An FMP without an M&O plan, especially in our district, is not a facilities plan – it’s a proposed project list unclear about how the conditions will be improved now – for the remainder of the 2025-2026 and 2026-2027 school years, let alone over the 10-year lifetime of the plan. If the District cannot show a credible path to staffing, preventive maintenance, work order response, and cleaning standards – especially while many buildings remain in service for years – then the plan will not deliver the basic conditions necessary for teaching and learning.

**Council ask:** require the District to present an M&O baseline and improvement plan: staffing levels, response metrics, backlog strategy, and how these align with the promised building-condition improvements.

Fifth: **financial realism.** The plan makes major promises – improving Poor and Unsatisfactory buildings, addressing critical systems, and supporting major transitions. But based on what we know about the scale of system renewal needs, it is not clear that the 10-year funding assumptions – especially for M&O – match what would be required to deliver those outcomes.

So Council's role here is essential: require a transparent financial model that connects dollars to scope, scope to schedule, and schedule to measurable outcomes – so we can see, year by year, how buildings move from Poor/Unsatisfactory to Good in a way that is verifiable.

To close: we support urgent repairs and we want the District to succeed, and we have a lot of ideas and specific recommendations and input to provide that we think can help. But success, having public trust and confidence, and ensuring that every student, in every school building, in every zip code is in at least adequate conditions, requires transparency, realistic capacity planning, defined scopes for modernization and maintenance, a credible M&O plan, and a financial model tied to measurable outcomes. Please require the District to work in a more open, collaborative, and direct way with the PFT and other stakeholders to share and publish underlying and missing data before any further planning and “approval of the plan” actions move forward.


Thank you.

## APPENDIX – FIGURES, CHARTS, TABLES & DASHBOARDS

(Please note that numbers and costs provided in Figures/Charts 4-12 represent preliminary draft analysis based on data published by/available from the School District of Philadelphia – data and info in Figures 1-3 come from PFT Mobile App Reporting)

### Figure 1: Mobile App Problem Report Summary

Bar chart of reports by problem type from PFT Health Schools Tracker since 2024-09-01




Total number of problems: 1,526


Total number of individual people reporting problems: 704

Total number of schools/buildings from which problems reported: 179


**Figure 2: Problem reports by School Building Score (SBS) Rating for 71 “Directly Impacted” schools** (*program level data*)



**Figure 3: Problem reports by School Building Score (SBS) Rating for all schools** (*program level data*)



**Figure 4: Chart of Recommended Actions for Most Directly Impacted Buildings (76) Associated with School Programs (71)**



#### FCA Repair Cost Information

- Details provided below are preliminary estimates and calculations based on currently available SDP data and information

Total repair cost of unsatisfactory or poor systems in district managed buildings – preliminary estimate: \$4.10B

Total number of unsatisfactory or poor systems in district managed buildings: 3,544


Total number of buildings with unsatisfactory or poor systems: 211

Total repair cost of all unsatisfactory or poor systems: 3.6B\$ (\$3,607,981,099)

Students in buildings with unsatisfactory or poor systems: 114,141


Buildings leaving the district vs. staying: Leaving: The building was coded as Closing - No longer SDP Space (10) --- **Staying:** (All other main, LSH, annex buildings used by the district) 238

**Figure 5 -- Pie chart of buildings count and percent of all buildings managed by district by Leaving (no longer the responsibility of the SDP) or Staying (remains an SDP property)**



- This chart shows that of the 248 buildings considered by the SDP, 10 of those buildings (4%) will no longer be owned, operated or managed by the District; the magnitude of the number of closing schools results in very small relative cost savings for the District


**Figure 6 –Repair costs and Number of Systems Rated as Poor & Unsatisfactory in the 2022/2024 Parsons FCA Reports**



Two (2) axis bar chart showing, on the left, the number (160) of deficient systems in “leaving” buildings and the “repair/replacement” costs associated with “fixing” those deficient systems in millions of dollars (\$179.43 M) of buildings categorized as leaving or staying.

On the right side, we show the total number (3,384) of deficient systems in the remaining SDP buildings and the estimated “repair/replacement” costs in millions of dollars (\$3.9 billion) associated with “fixing” those deficient systems.

**Figure 7 - Repair Cost of Critical System Components Considered to be Unsatisfactory or Poor Based on Review of the 2022 Parsons FCA reports**



**Each set of bars looks at a critical major system (details related to the “leaving” schools vs the “remaining” schools)**

Supporting table with system count below (same data represented in Figure 7)

System	Leaving Repair Cost	Staying Repair Cost	Leaving System Count	Staying System Count	Total Sum of repairCost	Total Count of system_code
B20 - Exterior Enclosure	\$18.68M	\$307.58M	17	266	\$326.26M	283
B30 - Roofing	\$0.31M	\$9.60M	1	25	\$9.91M	26
C30 - Interior Finishes		\$31.76M		32	\$31.76M	32
D20 - Plumbing	\$11.54M	\$318.20M	26	596	\$329.74M	622
D30 - HVAC	\$89.34M	\$1,712.79M	30	564	\$1,802.13M	594
D50 - Electrical	\$12.27M	\$232.64M	17	340	\$244.91M	357
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>\$132.14M</b>	<b>\$2,612.57M</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>1,823</b>	<b>\$2,744.71M</b>	<b>1,914</b>

**Figure 8 – Building Level Analysis – Count of Unsatisfactory & Poor Systems by SBS for 54 Receiving Buildings & Costs to Repair/Replace**




- Figure 8 shows the number of deficient critical systems in each of the SBS categories with the associated cost to repair/replace them – as an example for buildings with an SBS rating of “Good” there are 102 deficient systems and the costs to address the deficiencies would cost an estimated \$153.09 million schools
- 2 receiving buildings rated excellent that have no reported unsatisfactory or poor systems)

**Figure 9 – Building Level Analysis – Count of Unsatisfactory & Poor Systems**  
**Count by SBS for ALL Buildings**



- Figure 9 represents the same data as Figure 8 but includes all buildings currently owned, operated and/or managed by the SDP

**Figure 10 – Annual Benchmark Needs for Maintenance & Operations & Capital Improvement**



The description of annual M&O and Capital Infrastructure funding needs is from the 21<sup>st</sup> CSF's 2025 State of the Schools Report

(<https://www.21csf.org/page-content.php?pid=15>) and shows the basic funding necessary for school districts to ensure an at least adequate infrastructure – for M&O, by itself, as well as for Capital Improvements, alone, each costs 3% of the total infrastructure valuation of the portfolio of buildings. In the SDP, a fair and modest estimation is \$18.5 billion dollars – given that at least \$555 million per year for each capital and M&O ( $\$18.5 \text{ billion} \times .03$ ). So the yearly total annual capital and M&O contribution should be  $> \$1 \text{ billion/year}$  with additional dollars needed for addressing any existing deferred maintenance.

### Figure 11: Preliminary Finding - Potentially Significant Lack of Capacity in Some Receiving Schools

In the table below, nine (9) schools identified to “receive” students and staff from closing schools/programs/buildings are displayed (the actual numbers of students each school might actually receive compared to those currently enrolled in the feeder school as well as how many of those currently attending the receiving school listed below, is not fully known/knowable at this time.

School Program Name & ULCS	Status in SDP Proposed FPP	Site Acreage	Main Building – Gross Square Feet (GSF)	Current Student Enrollment	Current SQFT per student (calculated)	Capacity_2024-2025 as Reported by SDP	Main Building GSF/SDP Capacity	Additional GSF Needed for Listed SDP Capacity & Ed Spec Metrics
Carnell – 7220	Receiving	3.68	98,408	652	151	1209	81	80,500
Catharine – 1250	Receiving	1.95	57,500	377	153	473	122	12,500
Lawton – 7330	Receiving	2	79,856	513	156	853	94	46,400
Bluford – 4520	Receiving	1.64	78,257	490	160	450	173	Already Over Utilized
Cassidy – 4240	Receiving	1.91	59,123	363	163	528	112	19,000
Carver HSES – 4030	Receiving	4.51	149,810	906	165	950	158	N/A (HS—separate benchmark)
Elkin – 5260	Receiving	2.57	71,508	431	166	931	77	66,300
Bache-Martin – 2210	Receiving	0.58, 1.82 (2 buildings)	103,300	622	166	1027	101	48,700
Rhoads – 1410	Receiving	1.46	70,000	415	169	881	80	60,400

Relevant explanation, notes & questions re: Table 1:

- Column 1 includes school program name & 4-digit ULCS code | Column 2 is proposed status (typically “closing” or “receiving”) recommended by the SDP
- Column 3 is site acreage | Column 4 is gross square feet (GSF) of main building | Column 5 is the current school enrollment (from SDP data)
- Column 6 is SQFT/student (current enrollment) | Column 7 is SDP enrollment capacity | Column 8 is calculated GSF/student at SDP capacity number
- **Note:** Column 9 - “Additional GSF Needed” (Column 9) is calculated for K-8 receiving schools using a **148 GSF/student** planning target (SDP Ed Specs PK-8 model). Values are rounded to the nearest ~100 SF.
- Acceptable GSF/student capacity varies by grade level (ES =145 GSF/student | MS = 175GSF/student | HS = 200 GSF/student) – based on these numbers It does not look as though any of the schools listed below have the building capacity to accept students from closing schools and still provide appropriate class sizes, adequate common area use, common spaces, special education areas, or student supports areas.
- Several issues are revealed in the data above re: capacity and moving students and staff:
  - Using SDP’s own published capacities, several receiving schools would operate at gross square-foot-per-student levels far below SDP’s own educational-spec planning assumptions—this suggests that the FPP capacity figures are not well aligned and significant adverse consequences associated with the moving/merging/relocation and closing plan will occur likely impacting the ability to deliver the promised high-quality, equitable, and improved programing without major additions, reprogramming, or enrollment caps.
  - Bluford is already, according to SDP info, over capacity – how can it accept students? What is the plan?
  - Carver does not appear space-deficient by GSF/student at stated capacity, but it has limited remaining enrollment headroom and (as a specialized HS) requires program spaces that reduce practical ability to absorb additional students
  - The last column highlights the fact that except for Bluford and Carver (over utilized and adequately utilized) the other 7 schools would need to add significant additional square footage to accept the student population listed as capacity.
  - In many instances, SDP’s published capacity figures appear inconsistent with SDP’s own educational-spec gross area planning assumptions for delivering a full program

**Capacity methodology note:** SDP’s published “capacity” figures appear inconsistent with SDP’s Educational Specifications space-planning assumptions when tested against main-building GSF in multiple receiving schools. SDP should document precisely how the published capacity values were calculated (e.g., classroom inventory used; assumed class sizes by grade; whether special education/support rooms are counted as capacity-bearing; treatment of labs/CTE spaces; and whether annex/LSH buildings are included in both GSF and capacity). Until that methodology is transparent and verifiable, the published capacity figures should be treated as provisional for planning moves that could affect class size, common-space use, and student supports.

**Figure 12: Preliminary Finding: Costs Associated with Bringing 28 Receiving Schools with Facility Condition Index Ratings of >30% into Good Condition**

In the table below, 28 Receiving schools have an FCI of over 30%. The estimated cost to bring these schools into adequate repair = nearly \$900 million (using \$700 per GSF as CRV).

School Program Name & ULCS	Status in SDP Proposed FPP	Current Student Enrollment	Acreage (Site)	Main Building – Gross Square Feet (GSF)	Most Recent Main Bldg. FCI	\$\$ of Deficiency Needs (GSF*CRV)*FCI%
Dunbar - 5250	Receiving	223	0.95	53,200	60.46%	22,515,304.00
Pennell - 6340	Receiving	249	1.89	70,498	57.97%	28,607,383.42
Bache-Martin - 2210	Receiving	622	0.58, 1.82	103,300	56.53%	40,876,843.00
Overbrook High - 4020	Receiving	466	4.43	323,316	55.55%	125,721,426.60
Sullivan - 7430	Receiving	378	2.32	65,000	53.34%	24,269,700.00
Spring Garden - 5560	Receiving	247	1.03	43,000	53.04%	15,965,040.00
Ellwood - 7260	Receiving	252	2.74	55,621	52.63%	20,491,332.61
AMY at Martin - 5430	Receiving	208	1.17	144,000	51.17%	51,579,360.00
Patterson - 1400	Receiving	353	1.5	72,876	46.91%	23,930,292.12
Carnell - 7220	Receiving	652	3.68	98,408	46.30%	31,894,032.80
Hartranft - 5320	Receiving	337	3.66	85,000	44.51%	26,483,450.00
Hill-Freedman - 6460	Receiving	650	6.42	168,259	44.06%	51,894,440.78
Day - 6200	Receiving	289	4.47	67,158	43.36%	20,383,796.16
Howe - 7320	Receiving	225	1.09	40,500	43.33%	12,284,055.00
Prince Hall - 7490	Receiving	317	3.38	79,000	42.83%	23,684,990.00
Cramp - 5470	Receiving	317	2.47	80,088	41.82%	23,444,961.12
Elkin - 5260	Receiving	431	2.57	71,508	41.80%	20,923,240.80
Edmonds - 6210	Receiving	376	5.81	80,500	40.61%	22,883,735.00
Heston - 4300	Receiving	219	3.99	81,640	38.74%	22,139,135.20
Rowen - 7530	Receiving	272	2.82	56,400	38.12%	15,049,776.00
Catharine - 1250	Receiving	377	1.95	57,500	37.73%	15,186,325.00
Marshall, John - 7360	Receiving	243	0.8	58,450	37.28%	15,253,112.00
MYA - 1580	Receiving	122	2.23	120,000	34.26%	28,778,400.00
McKinley - 5350	Receiving	275	2.76	74,314	33.30%	17,322,593.40
Kelley - 4560	Receiving	205	1.7	72,000	31.58%	15,916,320.00
Bartram - 1010	Receiving	594	7.42	270,000	31.16%	58,892,400.00
SLA at Beeber - 2680	Receiving	492	2.76	139,000	31.04%	30,201,920.00

- The 28 listed “receiving” schools require almost a billion \$\$s of work to bring them from their current condition status to a condition of fair to good condition
- In addition to work needed at the 29 schools listed above there are approximately an additional 31 schools/buildings that are part of the closing-receiving transition plan that require major and significant upgrading, maintenance and modernization action to be taken (only 11 schools/buildings are going to be fully transferred/closed/sold/conveyed to the City of the total number of 71 schools/buildings directly and primarily impacted by the FPP).
- Total costs needed to upgrade and modernize these schools as described and promised by the SDP would likely be well in excess of \$2 billion, and these 71 schools are only 25% of the total district portfolio of buildings needing attention and work.

(The 2 Preliminary Findings tables above [Figures 10 & 11] with notes and explanations, provided courtesy of the National Center on School Infrastructure/21st Century School Fund [NCSI-21CSF], with abbreviations following and hyper links to [www.school-infrastructure.org](http://www.school-infrastructure.org))